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to Anti-Homeless Systems
Kathryn Hansel*
ABSTRACT
Homelessness is a perennial problem in the United States and has been analyzed
using many theoretical frameworks. The issue has also been a contentious one for courts
and continues to be the subject of numerous suits today. Many jurisdictions in the United
States have enacted laws that prevent homeless people from legally existing within those
jurisdictions; these laws effectively criminalize being homeless. These statutes have
spawned lawsuits alleging violations of homeless people‘s rights. This Comment
examines homelessness and its interaction with the law through the lens of citizenship. It
argues that the legal paradigm in the United States denies homeless people full
citizenship and membership in communities. Court decisions that rule on rights-based
challenges to these laws reinforce the exclusion of the homeless from the public, even
when they ostensibly rule for homeless plaintiffs, by restricting homeless people‘s ability
to take advantage of these decisions and denying homeless people the same menu of
rights that exist for people with residences.
I. INTRODUCTION
―As citizens of this democracy, you are the rulers and the ruled, the law-givers and
the law-abiding, the beginning and the end.‖
-Adlai Stevenson1
¶1

During the past few years, homelessness in the United States has fluctuated and
has experienced an increase following the foreclosure crisis. 2 This increase has
reinvigorated the many controversial debates surrounding homelessness that have existed
for so long and have inevitably evaded solutions. 3 The discourse surrounding
*

B.A., 2006, University of Minnesota, Morris. J.D. candidate, 2011, Northwestern University School of
Law.
1
ADLAI E. STEVENSON, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF ADLAI STEVENSON 9 (1965).
2
See Ian Urbina, Running in the Shadows: Recession Drives Surge in Youth Runaways, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2009, at A1; Peter S. Goodman, Victims of Foreclosure Turn to Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, at
A1; Leslie Kaufman, Record Number of Families Seeking Refuge in Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at
A35.
3
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302(a) (2000). The McKinney Act
defines homeless as:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is—
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homelessness has taken many forms. Sociologists, for example, have often focused on
the causes of homelessness, particularly whether homelessness is the result of individual
behavior and choices or is socially and structurally driven. 4 Others have attempted to
quantify issues surrounding homelessness 5 or discuss the social or charitable programs in
place to deal with homelessness. 6 This Comment does not deal with the causes of
homelessness, but rather addresses the legal structure and theoretical discourses that
contribute to defining homelessness.
This Comment will offer a unique perspective on homelessness and the law
through the lens of citizenship and political identity. The legal discourse surrounding
homelessness does not consider theoretical discussions of citizenship or community.
Even those legal challenges to anti-homeless measures that have been successful do not
shift the legal paradigm that excludes the homeless from political community and
effective citizenship. Instead, they reinforce the exclusion of the homeless from public
space and from the definition of public itself.
Part II of this Comment is a survey of the laws and legal challenges to laws that
affect the homeless. Part III will consider theories in citizenship and the relationship
between citizenship, social class, and property. Part IV will argue that the homeless are
denied full citizenship in the United States, that the legal system and jurisprudence
surrounding ―the home‖ fundamentally disfavor the homeless, and that the rights-based
remedies courts have employed are insufficient to shift the paradigm that denies
citizenship to the homeless.
Finally, Part V of this Comment will consider whether the economic crisis may
have, at least briefly, acted to shift that paradigm by altering the concept of the ―other‖—
that which is excluded from the social definition of belonging or ―us‖—in relation to
homelessness, and as a result altered the inclusion of the homeless in citizenship.
This Comment will argue that legal challenges are unsuccessful in addressing
homelessness and serve instead to reinforce the exclusion of the homeless from political
community or citizenship. While the courts are restrained to a certain extent in their
ability to restore citizenship to the homeless, courts may be able to help create space for
the homeless in citizenship by acknowledging the legitimacy of alternatives to traditional
residences.

(A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to provide temporary
living accommodations (including welfare hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional
housing for the mentally ill);
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for individuals intended to be
institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping
accommodation for human beings.
Id.
4
See, e.g., Thomas Main, How to Think about Homelessness: Balancing Structural and Individual Causes,
7 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 41 (1998); see also DISAFFILIATED MAN—ESSAYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
ON SKID ROW, VAGRANCY, AND OUTSIDERS (H.M. Bahr ed., 1970).
5
See THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS-SODEXO, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY: A STATUS
REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICAN CITIES 71–90 (2005), available at
http://www.usmayors.org/hungersurvey/2005/HH2005FINAL.pdf.
6
See MARTHA R. BURT ET AL., HOMELESSNESS: PROGRAMS AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE (1999),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/homelessness.pdf.
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II. LAWS AND CHALLENGES

¶6

¶7

¶8

Laws that disproportionately affect homeless people come in a variety of forms.
Vagrancy laws, which criminalized certain categories of people, provide one historical
example. While these laws never used the term ―homeless,‖ by imposing fines or
imprisonment on groups such as ―rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go
about begging,‖ ―common night walkers,‖ and ―persons wandering or strolling around
from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, [and]
disorderly persons,‖ vagrancy laws ensured that homeless people were classified as
criminals and punished for their lack of a residence. 7
Another example, loitering laws, prohibit behavior rather than criminalizing types
of people, but have a similar effect on homeless people. Some loitering laws specifically
target certain behavior (―[l]oiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the
purpose of begging‖),8 while others simply prohibit prolonged or purposeless presence in
public areas.9 Other laws prohibit behavior that is associated with homelessness, like
begging or panhandling.10 Many recent laws, referred to as ―anti-camping‖ ordinances,
prohibit standing, sitting, or lying in public areas. 11 Unlike vagrancy laws, which made
the criminalization of the homeless (or ―vagrants‖) explicit, newer laws do not reference
any particular target group. These laws can be seen as anti-homeless because they are
perceived to covertly target the homeless and because enforcement of these laws
disproportionately affects the homeless. 12 Moreover, these laws are anti-homeless
because while they may be phrased in less offensive terms than the now defunct vagrancy
laws, they nevertheless criminalize the lack of a home in much the same way.
In addition to statutes that disproportionately affect the homeless, homeless people
may also be subject to selective or disproportionate enforcement of laws by the police.
Challenges to measures that adversely and disproportionately affect the homeless have
come in various forms, including procedural due process, substantive due process, equal
protection, and First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment
challenges.13 Groups have brought suits challenging statutes that single out the homeless
both on their face14 and as applied.15 This Part discusses anti-homeless measures, the
wide variety of legal challenges that have been used to attempt to overturn them, and
their respective successes in the courts. This Comment focuses primarily on the most
recent successful challenges: those based on the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of
criminalizing status.16

7

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972).
N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35 (1) (2005).
9
See U.S. ex. rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974).
10
See, e.g., Young v. N.Y.C. Transfer Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
11
See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 11.00(m), 41.18(d) (2005).
12
For example, one would assume that a family picnicking in a public park would not be arrested or
charged under this kind of law.
13
See infra Sections II.A.–II.F.1.
14
See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996) (challenging an ordinance prohibiting
sitting or lying in public under the First Amendment).
15
See, e.g., Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (challenging anti-homeless ordinances
and their enforcement in Miami); see text accompanying infra note 33.
16
See infra Section Part II.A.1.
8
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A. Procedural Due Process
¶9

Challenges to anti-homeless ordinances and their enforcement often claim that
these ordinances deny the homeless procedural due process. Challenges under the Due
Process Clause have generally taken one of the following two forms: vagueness or
overbreadth.
1. Vagueness

¶10

In the 1972 case Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court struck
down a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance, which characterized and criminalized, in broad
terms, a series of groups as ―vagrants‖ subject to arrest, fines, and imprisonment.17 The
statute identified more than twenty groups as vagrants, including ―rogues and
vagabonds,‖ ―common drunkards,‖ ―persons wandering or strolling around from place to
place without any lawful purpose or object,‖ and ―persons able to work but habitually
living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children.‖ 18 The Court found that the
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it ‗fails to give
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct
is forbidden by the statute,‘ and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions. 19

¶11

In holding that the law was unconstitutional, the Court found that the
criminalization of select groups undermined the rule of law. 20 In rejecting the statute, the
opinion credited non-conforming behaviors like wandering with promoting American
values and the right to dissent 21 and went so far as to poeticize famous wanderers and
quasi-homeless figures, including Walt Whitman and Henry David Thoreau, who
embodied that dissenting spirit. 22 The Court concluded that the law was ―not compatible
17

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 n.1 (1972).
Jacksonville Ordinance Codes 26–57 provided at the time of these arrests and convictions
as follows: ‗Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards,
common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd,
wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and
habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually
living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and,
upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D
offenses.‘
Class D offenses at the time of these arrests and convictions were punishable by ninety days of
imprisonment, a $500 fine, or both. Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 162 (internal citations omitted).
20
Id. at 163.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 164.
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with our constitutional system‖ 23 and would subject people to punishment based on the
whims of the police.24 Finally, the Court analogized this kind of vagrancy law to
oppressive systems of punishment in Russia. 25
¶12
When the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Papachristou, vagrancy laws
were common in nearly every state, although groups had begun to challenge them on a
number of different grounds.26 Since Papachristou, states and municipalities have
employed new methods of criminalizing homelessness, including, ―anti-camping‖
ordinances, which ostensibly punish conduct rather than groups of people. 27 These laws
usually are challenged under similar theories to vagrancy laws. 28
¶13
For example, loitering laws became common after Papachristou. Since then,
general loitering laws have also been found to be unconstitutionally vague. In United
States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, the Second Circuit found that a statute stating that a
person who ―loiters, remains or wanders‖ without apparent reason, under suspicious
circumstances, and refuses to identify oneself to the police was unconstitutionally vague
for failing to distinguish licit from illicit behavior and for failing to provide sufficient
enforcement guidelines.29 Loitering ordinances directed at more specific behavior or
limited to certain time periods, however, have generally been upheld. Anti-nuisance laws
These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling
of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have
dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the
right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than
hushed, suffocating silence.
Id. The court‘s acceptance, and even celebration, of homelessness and incident behaviors as an alternative
lifestyle has not survived in more recent decisions regarding laws that impact the homeless. See Anderson
v. City of Portland, 2009 WL 2386056, at *10 (D. Or. July 31, 2009). The District Court in Anderson,
while finding for the homeless class of plaintiffs, insisted that the plaintiffs homelessness be both
involuntary and not constitute behavior that society has an interest in preventing (whether or not that
behavior is otherwise illegal). Id. The court‘s insistence on these criteria probably stems, at least in part,
from a desire to limit the reach of the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on the criminalization of status.
However, any narrative validating a homeless lifestyle as a choice has undoubtedly been lost. See also
Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1555, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (relying on the involuntariness of the
homeless plaintiffs‘ conduct in finding that the city had violated the Eighth Amendment by arresting them
for behavior such as sleeping, eating, and bathing).
23
Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168–69.
24
Id. at 166–67 (―Where the list of crimes is so all-in-clusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance,
those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority.‖).
25
Id. at 169.
26
See, e.g., Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969) (finding a vagrancy ordinance
unconstitutionally vague and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Smith v. Hill, 285
F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (finding a vagrancy law from a North Carolina town that disallowed ―tramps,
vagrants, persons under suspicion who shall be found with no visible means of support‖ from public places
unconstitutionally vague for failing to sufficiently define the conduct that it criminalized).
27
See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515 (2009).
28
See, e.g., Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see infra text accompanying
note 33.
29
492 F.2d 1166, 1173–74 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)
(finding a California statute requiring people loitering or wandering on the streets to provide ―credible and
reliable‖ identification was unconstitutionally vague for failing to sufficiently define ―credible and
reliable‖); City of Akron v. Effland, 174 N.E.2d 285 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (finding an anti-loitering law
unconstitutional as applied to people waiting on the street).
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that limit loitering only on Government property, and not in public, may also be more
likely to be upheld. 30
2. Overbreadth
¶14

In addition to vagueness claims, courts have also considered theories of
overbreadth under procedural due process claims. This claim is more limited in
constitutional scope than vagueness claims, is brought less often, and is less often
successful. Overbreadth challenges are usually seen in the First Amendment context,
which may explain why they are more rarely used to challenge most anti-homeless laws.
To be upheld, a facial overbreadth challenge must be directed at laws that touch some
constitutionally protected conduct.31 A statute is overbroad if it substantially burdens
constitutionally protected conduct and is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 32
¶15
In Pottinger v. City of Miami, a class of homeless plaintiffs brought a § 1983 suit
against the City of Miami alleging that the city had a ―custom, practice and policy of
arresting, harassing and otherwise interfering with homeless people for engaging in basic
activities of daily life—including sleeping and eating-in the public places where they are
forced to live.‖33 The plaintiffs additionally alleged that the city arrested homeless
people under various Miami and Florida statutes for participating in the same types of
life-sustaining conduct.34 The plaintiffs challenged the application of these statutes on a
number of constitutional grounds under both the Federal and Florida Constitutions. 35
These challenges included a substantive due process argument under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments,36 a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, 37 an
unreasonable search and seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment, 38 fundamental
rights challenges,39 including the right to travel, an Eighth Amendment challenge alleging
cruel and unusual punishment and the criminalization of status,40 and a state claim of
malicious abuse of process.41 The conduct that the plaintiffs sought to enjoin included
arrests, sweeps designed to get homeless people out of plain sight, and the burning or
general destruction of their personal property.42
¶16
The court ultimately found that the plaintiffs‘ rights had been violated under the
Eighth, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and granted an injunction based on
five of the plaintiffs theories:
30

See, e.g., United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1970).
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
32
Id.
33
Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1554.
34
Id. These statutes criminalized behavior such as standing, loitering, walking, sleeping, and obstructing
passage on public land. Id. at 1560.
35
The plaintiffs did not challenge the statutes in question on their face, but instead only sought to enjoin the
city from arresting homeless people for ―inoffensive conduct‖ that they are ―forced to perform in public.‖
Id.
36
Id. at 1572.
37
Id. at 1577.
38
Id. at 1569.
39
Id. at 1578.
40
Id. at 1561–62.
41
Id. at 1565.
42
Id. at 1555–56.
31
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First, plaintiffs have shown that the City has a pattern and practice of
arresting homeless people for the purpose of driving them from public
areas. . . .
Second, the City‘s practice of arresting homeless individuals for harmless,
involuntary conduct which they must perform in public is cruel and
unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. . . .
Third, such arrests violate plaintiffs‘ due process rights because they reach
innocent and inoffensive conduct. . . .
Fourth, the City‘s failure to follow its own written procedure for handling
personal property when seizing or destroying the property of homeless
individuals violates plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights. . . .
Fifth, the City‘s practice of arresting homeless individuals for performing
essential, life-sustaining acts in public when they have absolutely no place
to go effectively infringes on their fundamental right to travel in violation
of the equal protection clause.43
¶17

Unlike many vagrancy challenges, the procedural due process claim of the
plaintiffs in Pottinger did not include a vagueness claim. 44 Instead, the plaintiffs alleged
that the application of the statutes in question was overbroad and the action authorized
under them extended beyond the reach of police power.45 Because the conduct for which
the police had arrested plaintiffs was constitutionally protected (in other words, it
implicated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments), the court found that the statute was
overbroad as applied because the arrests of the plaintiffs were for ―harmless, inoffensive
conduct that they are forced to perform in public places.‖46
¶18
Most courts, however, have rejected due process overbreadth claims. In Whiting v.
Town of Westerly, for example, the First Circuit found that a law prohibiting sleeping in
public areas was not overbroad because sleeping is not a constitutionally protected
activity. 47 The court noted that sleeping might sometimes implicate the First
Amendment, but without an expressive element, mere sleeping was not constitutionally
protected conduct.48
B. Substantive Due Process Challenges
¶19

Substantive due process challenges have claimed that anti-homeless measures
violate a number of fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, including the
43

Id. at 1554.
Id. at 1576.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1577.
47
Whiting v. Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 21–22 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333
(Wash. 1990); People v. Trantham, 208 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984).
48
Whiting, 942 F.2d at 21–22.
44
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right to privacy. Courts have generally rejected substantive due process challenges,
although some have been successful. For example, in Roulette v. City of Seattle, the
court rejected the plaintiffs‘ facial substantive due process claim, as well as their First
Amendment claim. 49 The plaintiffs alleged that the Seattle statute that criminalized
sitting or lying on sidewalks during certain hours was merely a veiled attempt to remove
homeless people from Seattle‘s commercial areas. 50 The court found that because the
plaintiffs challenged the statute on its face and not its application, and because the city
presented legitimate public safety reasons for the ordinance, the plaintiffs‘ substantive
due process claims failed.51
¶20
Other courts, however, have sometimes accepted substantive due process claims
even in the face of government interests like public safety. Pottinger v. City of Miami is
such a case, which also presents a number of other successful legal theories. 52
¶21
In Pottinger, the plaintiffs brought substantive due process claims alleging that the
application of local and state ordinances against, for example, sleeping, violated their
fundamental right to travel and to ―engage in life sustaining activities in public.‖ 53 The
court rejected that ―engaging in life sustaining activities‖ was a fundamental right. 54
However, it recognized that the right to travel was guaranteed by the Constitution and
found that arresting people for sleeping in public violated the fundamental rights to travel
and to freedom of movement.55 The ordinances penalized travel by denying plaintiffs the
―necessities of life‖ and a place where they can lawfully be. 56 The court held that the city
had a legitimate but not compelling interest in the aesthetics of its public spaces, crime
prevention and promoting business, but that its ordinances and the methods of enforcing
them were not the least intrusive manner of enforcing that interest. 57 The court also
rejected crime prevention as a possible compelling interest, holding that criminality could
not be ascribed to the homeless by virtue of their homelessness. 58
¶22
Claims alleging violations of the fundamental right to travel or to exercise freedom
of movement (as the Plaintiffs‘ claim in Pottinger did) are some of the most common and
most frequently successful claims brought under substantive due process theories. The
Supreme Court has recognized numerous times that the right to interstate travel is a
fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny. 59 Both the Supreme Court and many lower
49

Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id.
51
Id.
52
Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
53
Id. at 1578.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1580.
56
Id. at 1563. Cf. Mem‘l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (holding that denying medical care
burdens the fundamental right to travel).
57
Id. at 1581–82.
58
Id. at 1582. As the court writes:
The City further argues that it would be disingenuous to ignore the criminal element
among the homeless. However, there is a criminal element among all of society, not just
among the homeless. The United States Supreme Court, in rejecting the idea that
criminality can be ascribed to the unfortunate, stated that no one can seriously contend
that a person without funds and without a job constitutes a ‗moral pestilence.‘
Id. (citing Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941)).
59
See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314
50
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courts, however, have been more reluctant to find that anti-homeless measures violate the
fundamental right to travel. In Anderson v. Portland, while the district court denied a
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs‘ Eighth Amendment and unequal application under the
Equal Protection Clause claims, it granted summary judgment to dismiss their
fundamental right to travel claim, stating:
I fail to discern how the alleged actions of the City interfere with
plaintiffs‘ constitutional right to travel. Plaintiffs allege that police officers
have told them to ―move along‖ when sleeping in public and conducted
camp clean-ups and seized their property. However, plaintiffs do not
allege that the City has attempted to restrain their movement, prevented
them from traveling to or from the City, or excluded them from certain
areas of the City.60
¶23

Other courts, however, have accepted challenges to statutes or practices directed at
the homeless under right to travel theories. 61 In Streetwatch v. National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, the district court for the Southern District of New York granted a
preliminary injunction of the arrests of people in a New York Amtrak station based in
part on the implication of the fundamental right to freedom of movement in the arrests. 62
The court found that a policy of the Amtrak police to eject or arrest people without
explanation who had been ―hanging around the station for too long,‖ unconstitutionally
infringed on the fundamental right to travel. 63
C. Equal Protection Challenges

¶24

The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether the homeless comprise a protected
class that warrants heightened scrutiny for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause. However, it has ruled that classifications based on wealth 64 or
tenancy65 do not constitute protected classes under the Fourteenth Amendment. As a
result, even facial classifications based on homelessness or wealth need only pass a
rational basis test. While challenges to anti-homeless measures continue to be brought
under the Equal Protection Clause, they are largely unsuccessful. 66
U.S. 160 (1941) (Couglas, William J., concurring); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (Taney, J.,
dissenting).
60
Anderson v. City of Portland, 2009 WL 2386056, at *10 (D. Or. July 31, 2009).
61
See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 392–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), rev’d, 892 P.2d
1145 (Cal. 1995); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1554.
62
Streetwatch v. Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
63
Id.
64
See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (holding that a classification based on wealth
does not merit heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and, thus, that a statute charging a flat
fee for elementary school bus service did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that an elementary school financing system based on
property taxes was not unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
65
See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (holding that a forcible entry and detainer act was not
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, and that distinctions based on home ownership or
tenancy do not receive heightened scrutiny).
66
Some lower courts have found that vagrancy laws, for example, violate the Equal Protection Clause
because they are arbitrary and unequally enforced. See, e.g., Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D.
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In Davison v. City of Tucson, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that the homeless
as a class were being discriminated against through selectively enforced criminal trespass
laws.67 These laws were only enforced against a particular encampment of homeless
people who had been camping on city property for more than ten years. 68 Relying on the
state supreme court‘s rejection of wealth and housing as legitimate bases for suspect
classifications, the court found that the homeless were not a protected class for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 The Court further held that based on the city‘s
legitimate interests in preventing crime, maintaining health and sanitation, and avoiding
liability, it was unlikely that the city‘s actions would fail the rational basis test. 70
D. First Amendment Challenges

Challenges to measures that allegedly violate the homeless‘ right to free speech
often apply to a broader group than just the homeless. Challenges to panhandling or
soliciting laws based on the right to free political speech under the First Amendment, for
example, are not limited to the homeless alone.
¶27
Two Second Circuit cases illustrate typical free speech challenges brought against
panhandling or soliciting laws. In Young v. New York City Transit Authority, the Second
Circuit held that New York City‘s prohibition on panhandling in subways did not violate
the First Amendment because panhandling was commercial, not political, speech, and the
city had an interest in preventing fear on the subway. 71 However, three years later, the
same court held in Loper v. New York City Police Department that begging was
communicative or expressive, provided that it is conducted in a traditional public forum
(outside of the subway system). 72 Further, the court held that the city did not present a
compelling interest sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass muster under the First
Amendment.73 Because the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects
solicitation of charitable donations. 74 As a result, many challenges focus on the issue of
whether panhandling is expressive or symbolic speech versus merely commercial
speech. 75
¶28
At least one First Amendment challenge focused on provisions directed
specifically at homeless people. In Roulette v. City of Seattle, a group of homeless
persons and their advocates invoked § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of a law
that forbade sitting or lying down on the sidewalk between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. 76 The
¶26

Colo. 1969) (holding that a vagrancy ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause without determining
whether poverty or homelessness are protected classes deserving of heightened scrutiny).
67
Davison v. City of Tuscon, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996).
68
Id. at 991.
69
Id. at 993 (citing Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972)).
70
Davison, 924 F. Supp. at 993.
71
Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
72
Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
73
Id.
74
Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
75
See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Laws Regulating Begging, Panhandling, or Similar Activity by Poor
or Homeless Persons, 7 A.L.R. 5TH 455 (2006).
76
Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302 (9th Cir. 1996).

454

Vol. 6:2]

Kathryn Hansel

plaintiffs claimed that the statute was unconstitutional on both free speech and
substantive due process grounds.77
¶29
Their free speech claim alleged that the statute was a facial violation of the First
Amendment; that is, that the ordinance itself—not just particular applications of it—
violated the protection of symbolic speech articulated in Spence v. Washington.78 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs‘ claim that the statute violated the First Amendment
on its face, finding that sitting and lying down were not integrally connected to
expression.79 Because almost any conduct can be expressive in some situation, for a
facial attack to succeed the challenged statute must narrowly target the expressive
behavior.80 The court did not, however, foreclose an as applied challenge.
E. Fourth Amendment Challenges
¶30

The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures has
been used to challenge a number of anti-homeless measures. Generally, this theory
cannot be used to attack anti-camping ordinances on their face because these ordinances
do not directly contemplate searches. However, in enforcing these ordinances and other
policies or statutes, law enforcement officers often appropriate or destroy the belongings
of the homeless, leading to potentially viable Fourth Amendment claims.
¶31
Police action may only be classified as a ―search‖ for Fourth Amendment purposes
if (1) the person has demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy surrounding the
object of the search; and (2) the expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable.81
¶32
The majority of courts considering the constitutionality of police searches and the
collection or destruction of the property of the homeless have held that these actions do
not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the homeless have no
reasonable expectation of privacy. In Whiting v. State, for example, the Maryland Court
of Appeals held that while the homeless defendant demonstrated a subjective expectation
of privacy in the building in which he was squatting, that expectation was not one that
society recognizes as reasonable. 82 The court cited lack of possessory interest, lack of
power to exclude, and lack of exclusive control in the property as factors in its decision. 83
¶33
Some courts have found that the homeless have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in homeless shelters, or at least in certain areas of homeless shelters. 84 However,

77

Id. at 302, 305.
Id. at 302–303 (―The First Amendment protects not only the expression of ideas through printed or
spoken words, but also symbolic speech—nonverbal ‗activity . . . sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication.‘‖).
79
Id. at 305.
80
Id.
81
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). A person has demonstrated
a subjective expectation of privacy when she exhibits an intention to keep objects, activities or statements
private. Id.
82
Whiting v. State, 885 A.2d 785, 799–801 (Md. 2005).
83
Id.
84
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Unknown Agents of U.S. Marshals Serv., 791 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1992).
78
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many courts have not been willing to extend Fourth Amendment protection to closed
containers (like lockers) used only by the plaintiff or defendant in homeless shelters. 85
¶34
There are very few courts that have found that the Fourth Amendment covers
personal property outside of homeless shelters. Most courts have held that the homeless
have no reasonable expectation of privacy on public property or on private property
where they have no lawful right to be.
¶35
The Pottinger court, however, found the city of Miami liable on Fourth
Amendment grounds due to its treatment of the homeless plaintiff‘s belongings. 86 The
court held that ―the gathering and destruction of class members‘ personal property is a
meaningful interference with their possessory interest in that property.‖ 87 In addition, the
court also held that: (1) the plaintiffs demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in
their belongings by arranging and protecting them so as to distinguish them from
abandoned property; and, (2) that that expectation of privacy was reasonable, even
though the property in question was on public land, because the property of the homeless
is often the last ―trace of privacy‖ they have and is also often located in places they
consider home.88
F. Eighth Amendment Challenges
¶36

Eighth Amendment challenges alleging cruel and unusual punishment have been
almost universally unsuccessful. In Davison v. City of Tucson, a class of plaintiffs
challenged a resolution disbanding ―Mountain Homeless Campground and Other
Homeless Encampments‖ that had existed on public lands for ten years. 89 The plaintiffs
asked the court for a preliminary injunction to prevent the destruction of their homes.
The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Eighth Amendment rights and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.90 The court summarily disposed of the
Eighth Amendment claim, finding that the plaintiffs had not been convicted of crimes so
they could not invoke the Eighth Amendment‘s protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.91
1. Eighth Amendment Prohibition on the Criminalization of Status

¶37

Because the Supreme Court found in Papachristou that vagrancy laws are
unconstitutionally vague,92 municipalities have shifted the ways in which they exclude
the homeless. Instead of laws that criminalize broad groups of people by labeling them
―vagrants,‖ cities began to criminalize a broad list of behavior using statutes often

85

See People v. McClain, 814 N.Y.S.2d 738 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that the defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker because the shelter‘s guidelines permitted searches and the
guidelines were posted).
86
Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1571–72.
89
Davison v. City of Tuscon, 924 F. Supp. 989, 991 (D. Ariz. 1996).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 992–93.
92
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 17–
25.
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referred to as ―anti-camping‖ ordinances.93 These laws usually prohibit sleeping, sitting,
and lying down, among other things, during certain times or in certain areas of the city.
The most restrictive of these laws prohibit all of these activities at all times anywhere
within the city limits. 94 Rather than criminalizing amorphous behaviors, they bring about
the physical exclusion of the homeless from numerous and, in some cases all, public
spaces. 95
¶38
These anti-homeless measures have led to legal challenges based on new legal
arguments. The most successful of these new arguments utilizes the prohibition of the
criminalization of status under the Eighth Amendment.96 The Supreme Court has held
that the Eighth Amendment limits the types of punishments a state may impose 97 and
their proportional severity,98 and also ―imposes substantive limits on what can be made
criminal.‖99 For example, behavior, such as drug possession, may be criminalized while
status, such as drug addiction, may not.100 While Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment challenges to anti-homeless statutes have generally failed, 101 challenges
under the prohibition of criminalization of status have been somewhat more successful. 102
For example, the Eighth Amendment prohibition on the criminalization of status was
used successfully to challenge vagrancy laws. 103 These statutes, which criminalize
drunkards, walkers, rogues and vagabonds, were explicitly directed toward statuses and
not behaviors (in other words, the statutes target drunkards, not drinking). 104 The use of
Eighth Amendment theories for anti-camping ordinances or other more modern statutes,
however, stretch the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to apply to certain conduct (like
sleeping), and is therefore much more controversial. 105 While this theory still fails more
93
94

See, e.g., cases cited infra note 106.
See Jones v. Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006) (vacated).
No person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any street, sidewalk or other public way.
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to persons sitting on the curb portion of any
sidewalk or street while attending or viewing any parade permitted under the provisions of
Section 103.111 of Article 2, Chapter X of this Code; nor shall the provisions of this
subsection supply [sic] to persons sitting upon benches or other seating facilities provided for
such purpose by municipal authority by this Code...

A violation of section 41.18(d) is punishable by a fine of up to $1000 and/or imprisonment of
up to six months.
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 11.00(m), 41.18(d) (2005).
95
See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 11.00(m), 41.18(d).
96
See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); see discussion infra Section II.F.1.a.
97
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
98
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
99
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (emphasis added).
100
See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
101
See supra Section F.
102
See Jones v. Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA,
2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 (S.D. Fla.
1992).
103
Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (finding that a vagrancy statute was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because it criminalized status).
104
See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972).
105
See, e.g., Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Mass. 1967) (―Idleness and poverty should
not be treated as a criminal offence.‖); Parker v. Municipal Judge of Las Vegas, 427 P.2d 642, 644 (Nev.
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than it succeeds, it has been accepted by a number of courts and continues to be used to
challenge anti-camping ordinances.106
i) Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court, and the Criminalization of Status
¶39

The criminalization of status was not held unconstitutional until the Supreme
Court‘s 1962 decision, Robinson v. California.107 In Robinson, the Supreme Court found
that criminalizing a status violated the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. The California statute in question criminalized addiction to
narcotics, even if the suspect had never used or possessed narcotics within the state.108
The Court concluded that any law that criminalized a status rather than an act could not
stand under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 109 However, six years later in
Powell v. State of Texas, the Court made it clear that this prohibition extended only to
status, and that behavior connected to a status could be criminalized. 110 Subsequently,
courts that have found that anti-camping statutes violate the Eighth Amendment and that
have extended the Robinson rule to apply to conduct integral to status have universally
limited their holdings to involuntary conduct.111 The most recent challenges to anticamping ordinances under the Eighth Amendment were brought in Portland and
Sacramento.112
ii) Jones v. Los Angeles: The Ninth Circuit

¶40

In Jones v. Los Angeles, a circuit court found, for the first time, that the Eighth
Amendment‘s prohibition on the criminalization of status extended to anti-camping
ordinances.113 The Ninth Circuit held that the limits on the criminalization of status from
Robinson extended to conduct that is an ―integral aspect of that status.‖114 The court
relied on the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Robinson and Powell, finding that the dissent
1967) (―It simply is not a crime to be unemployed, without funds, and in a public place. To punish the
unfortunate for this circumstance debases society.‖); see also Martin R. Gardner, Rethinking Robinson v.
California in The Wake of Jones v. Los Angeles: Avoiding The “Demise Of The Criminal Law” by
Attending to “Punishment”, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (2008).
106
See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Portland, No. 081447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218
(E.D. Cal. 2009).
107
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
108
CAL., HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (1964) (repealed 1972).
109
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (―But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a
criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖).
110
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1968) (declining to extend the holding in Robinson to acts that
stem from conditions or statuses). The Court held that the act of being drunk in public, although it might
be considered incident to the status of alcoholism (assuming alcoholism is a status), could constitutionally
be criminalized and did not affect an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violation. Id.
111
See Jones, 444 F.3d at 1137; Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or.
July 31, 2009); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
112
See Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Lehr v. City of
Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
113
Jones, 444 F.3d. at 1137.
114
Id. at 1132 (―The City could not expressly criminalize the status of homelessness by making it a crime to
be homeless without violating the Eighth Amendment, nor can it criminalize acts that are an integral aspect
of that status.‖).
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and the concurrence in Powell both suggested that, in certain circumstances,
criminalizing conduct connected to status would also be unconstitutional under the Eight
and Fourteenth Amendments.115 Los Angeles could not criminalize being homeless as a
status, nor could it criminalize ―sitting, lying, or sleeping on public streets and sidewalks
at all times and in all places within Los Angeles‘s city limits.‖116
¶41
The court rested its holding on the fact that the homeless appellants had no choice
but to be and sleep on the streets and thus concluded, ―[e]ven if Appellants‘ past
volitional acts contributed to their current need to sit, lie, and sleep on public sidewalks at
night, those acts are not sufficiently proximate to the conduct at issue here for the
imposition of penal sanctions to be permissible.‖117 The court‘s decision in Jones is
novel for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, but it also set the stage for later
challenges by homeless people based on the criminalization of status. The court
recognized the harm anti-camping statutes can inflict on homeless people. However, by
couching its decision within a requirement of involuntariness, the court limited both the
conditions under which plaintiffs could succeed and the extent to which the city was
required to treat homeless people as free members of its community. Other cases would
follow suit.
iii) Anderson v. City of Portland
¶42

In Anderson v. City of Portland, the District Court of Oregon denied a motion to
dismiss a suit challenging Portland‘s anti-camping ordinance which prohibited
establishing or maintaining a temporary place to live.118 The plaintiffs, labeled by the
court as ―involuntarily homeless,‖ challenged the enforcement.119 The ordinance
prohibited camping for the purpose of the statute as authorized by an Executive Order
issued by the Chief of Police to dismantle any established campsites. 120 The plaintiffs
brought claims under the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on the criminalization of
status and the rights of travel, movement, freedom, and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.121
¶43
The court held that the Eighth Amendment extended protection to conduct integral
to status.122 However, it diverged from the reasoning of the Jones court and other district
courts that held that anti-camping ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment.123 Instead,
115

Id. at 1135 (―[F]ive Justices in Powell understood Robinson to stand for the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the unavoidable
consequence of one's status or being.‖).
116
Id. at 1120.
117
Id. at 1137. In Pottinger v. City of Miami, the plaintiffs also brought a successful Eighth Amendment
claim. The district court found that ordinances that criminalized life sustaining activities constituted cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment by criminalizing ―involuntary conduct that is
inextricably related to that status.‖ Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The
court emphasized that the plaintiffs ―[had] no realistic choice but to live in public places.‖ Id.
118
Anderson v. Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *1 (D. Or. July 31, 2009) (citing P.C.C.
§ 14A.50.020 (A)(1)).
119
Id.
120
Id. at *2.
121
Id.
122
Id. at *6–*7
123
Id. at *6; see also Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000); Pottinger v. City of
Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla.1992).
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the Anderson court demanded that, in order to be found unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on the criminalization of status, the targeted conduct must be
involuntary, sufficiently related to the status, and the court must examine the extent to
which the ordinance in question criminalizes ―conduct that society has an interest in
preventing.‖124
¶44
After applying this rubric, the court then found that the ―City's enforcement of the
anti-camping and temporary structure ordinances criminalizes them for being homeless
and engaging in the involuntary and innocent conduct of sleeping on public property‖ and
therefore the plaintiffs stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment and survived the
motion to dismiss.125 While the Oregon court accepted the plaintiff‘s Eight Amendment
claim, it imposed more stringent requirements than previous courts by limiting
Robinson‘s applicability to both involuntary and innocent behavior.126
iv) Lehr v. City of Sacramento
¶45

Another district court, however, recently rejected any expansion of the Robinson
doctrine and held that even criminalization of broad categories of behavior almost
exclusively associated with homelessness are not unconstitutional because these
criminalizations apply to conduct, and not being homeless itself. 127 In Lehr v. City of
Sacramento, the district court for the Eastern District of California granted summary
judgment for the City of Sacramento on an Eighth Amendment challenge to the city‘s
anti-camping ordinance. 128 The plaintiffs, a diverse group of homeless people and
advocates, challenged the city‘s application of its anti-camping ordinance as a violation
of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of the criminalization of status. 129 The city‘s
ordinance criminalized ―camping,‖ which was defined expansively as camping or living
outdoors on all public property. 130 Among the city‘s stated rationales for the statute were
protection of public health, welfare, and safety, and the protection of private property and
the ―lawful and ordinary‖ uses for which the spaces were intended.131
¶46
The court rejected the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in the then-vacated Jones
decision. It found that the reach of Robinson and Powell was limited only to status and
did not extend to conduct society has an interest in preventing, or derivative conduct of
any kind. 132 The court concluded that because the statute at issue targeted conduct and
did not punish homeless people for being homeless, it was not unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment as a matter of law.133

124

Anderson, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7.
Id. In addition, the court denied the defendants‘ motion to dismiss under the Equal Protection Clause,
but granted it for the plaintiffs‘ right to travel, freedom of movement, and substantive due process claims.
Id. at *8–*10.
126
Id.
127
Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
128
Id. The court denied the defendants‘ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs‘ claims under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1235–36.
129
Id. at 1222.
130
Id. at 1224–25.
131
Id. at 1225.
132
Id. at 1231–32.
133
Id. at 1234.
125
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G. Conclusions

¶47

Of the few jurisdictions that have analyzed anti-camping ordinances under the
Robinson doctrine, few have accepted the theory. 134 In Joel v. City of Orlando, for
example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected homeless plaintiffs‘ claim that an anti-camping
ordinance unconstitutionally criminalized status.135 The court found that even if the
Robinson doctrine extended to behavior integral to status, as the Pottinger court had held,
camping was not such a behavior because there was sufficient shelter space to house the
city‘s entire homeless population.136 In addition, these types of challenges have been met
with criticism from commentators who have suggested that enjoining ordinances that
criminalize conduct integral to homelessness creates a slippery slope when drawing the
line regarding what kind of conduct can be prohibited.137
¶48
The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence surrounding homelessness limits the relief
the homeless can obtain from statutes that exclude them from public space. Rather than
prohibit statutes that target homeless behavior (standing, sitting, and particularly sleeping
in public areas), the courts have only struck down this kind of government action when
the homeless would be effectively banished if a statute were allowed to stand. 138 Even
those cases that result in a win for the homeless plaintiffs do so only in the limited
context of involuntariness.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS: CITIZENSHIP AND LIBERTY
¶49

Having considered the legal landscape of anti-homeless measures and the litigation
challenging them, this Comment will now turn to a discussion of the theoretical
frameworks that inform its analysis. This Section will focus on theories of citizenship
from Thomas Humphrey Marshall‘s essay Citizenship and Social Class and the work of
Kathleen Arnold on homelessness and citizenship. These theories give an extra-legal
context for homelessness and help to delineate the consequences of the way in which the
legal system deals with homelessness, beyond wins and losses in court. Through these
theories, this Comment will argue that even when homeless people win in court, they are
denied full membership in their communities and excluded from what it means to be a
citizen.
A. Thomas Humphrey Marshall: Citizenship and Social Class

¶50

In 1949, sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall authored a seminal article on
citizenship theory entitled Citizenship and Social Class.139 While his article dealt
specifically with the development of citizenship in Great Britain, his theoretical
framework proved influential in the development of citizenship theory generally. While
134

See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2000); Joyce v. City & County of S.F., 846
F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
135
Joel, 232 F.3d at 1362.
136
Id.
137
See Gardner, supra note 105.
138
See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Portland, No. 081447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009); Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1561
(S.D. Fla. 1992).
139
THOMAS HUMPHREY MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950).
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this theoretical framework is primarily sociological, not legal, it bears parallels to the
legal theories of citizenship, discussed briefly below. 140
¶51
Marshall frames his issue by attempting to define the interactions and parallels
between social class and citizenship, beginning with economist Alfred Marshall‘s essay
The Future of the Working Classes.141 In discussing Alfred Marshall‘s work, Thomas
Humphrey Marshall states:
Such, I think, is the sociological hypothesis latent in Marshall‘s essay. It
postulates that there is a kind of basic human equality associated with the
concept of full membership of a community or—or, as I should say, of
citizenship—which is not inconsistent with the inequalities which
distinguish the various economic levels in the society. In other words, the
inequality of the social class system may be acceptable provided the
equality of citizenship is recognized.142
Building off of Alfred Marshall‘s ―latent hypothesis,‖ T.H. Marshall sets out the
principle question he wishes to answer: ―Is it still true that basic equality, when enriched
in substance and embodied in the formal rights of citizenship, is consistent with the
inequalities of social class?‖ 143
¶53
Marshall defines three elements that create citizenship: civil, political, and social
rights.144 Civil rights are comprised of ―the rights necessary for individual freedom.‖145
Political rights involve the right to exercise political power, to hold political office, or to
elect a person to office. 146 Marshall‘s definition of the social element of rights is
somewhat more nebulous, but is basically analogous to positive liberties. 147 Marshall
refers to social rights as ―the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the
life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.‖ 148
¶54
Marshall traces the development of civil rights in the Eighteenth Century to the
recognition of the right to work: ―In the economic field the basic civil right is the right to
work, that is to say the right to follow the occupation of one‘s choice in the place of one‘s
choice, subject only to legitimate demands for preliminary technical training.‖ 149 The
idea of economic independence is essential to Marshall‘s conceptualization of citizenship
¶52

140

See infra text accompanying note 157.
MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 8.
142
Id. (emphasis added).
143
Id. at 9. Marshall also sought to explore the relationship of the free market and basic equality and the
shift from an emphasis on duty-based citizenship to rights-based citizenship. Id.
144
Id. at 10.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 11.
147
Positive liberties refer to the right to some benefit (such as welfare or education), whereas negative
rights refer to the right to be free from government intrusion or abuse. See David Abraham, Are Rights the
Right Thing? Individual Rights, Communitarian Purposes and America’s Problems, 25 CONN. L. REV. 947
(1993). The United States‘ guarantees of rights are usually described as a system of negative liberties. See
Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring) (―[T]he
Constitution (with immaterial exceptions) is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.‖).
148
MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 11.
149
Id.at 15–16.
141
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and is extremely important to the discussion of the relationship between homelessness
and citizenship. Once liberty is linked to economic status, the exclusion of those without
real property or a steady income from the national identity is guaranteed.
¶55
Marshall ties the development of political rights to the nineteenth century.
Political rights did not involve the creation of new rights, but the distribution of existing
rights to broader sectors of the population.150 The suffrage act in the twentieth century
solidified political rights as rights of citizenship along with civil rights. 151 The right to
political participation was the last element of modern citizenship recognized for men in
England. While political and civil rights developed in a different sequence for different
groups, the combination of these rights has come to be seen as the elements necessary for
citizenship.152
¶56
Finally, Marshall discusses the development of social rights beginning in the
nineteenth century and culminating in the twentieth. 153 There existed a division between
the rights of citizens on the one hand, and social rights and their position as an alternative
to, rather than as a guarantee of citizenship, on the other.154 Under the Poor Law and
other similar statutes, a person taking advantage of the protection of the government was
forced to forfeit civil and political rights. Those that took advantage of the Poor Law
were interned in workhouses (eliminating the ability to choose one‘s occupation,
Marshall‘s idea of the quintessential civil right) and lost franchise and other political
rights that they had. 155 Early improvements to working conditions were limited to
protections for women and children, who did not hold citizenship. Those who enjoyed
full citizenship had to forgo the protection of the government.156
B. Social Class and Citizenship in the United States
¶57

Marshall‘s definition of citizenship in terms of civil and political rights parallels
the basic nature of full citizenship in the United States.157 The Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution ties citizenship directly to civil liberties. 158 The Fifteenth
150

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
152
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002) (discussing the development of citizenship for women in the United
States through the Nineteenth and Fourteenth Amendments—in other words, political and civil rights).
153
MARSHALL, supra note 139, at 21–22.
154
Id. at 24.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 24–25.
157
Marshall tracks the development of citizenship from civil to political to social rights. This timeline is
certainly not universal. Women‘s liberties in the United States, for example, developed in a different order.
As Marshall points out, women had social rights before they had rights of citizenship. In addition, women
gained political rights before they gained civil rights. However, it is the structure of the theory, and not its
historical development in a particular place, on which this Comment builds.
158
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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Amendment links it to political liberties. 159 The structure of citizenship under the
Constitution follows Marshall‘s framework, and enforces the dual concepts of civil and
political liberties as defining citizenship. The struggle of black Americans during the
nineteenth century to gain civil and political equality is synonymous with a struggle for
citizenship, which these Reconstruction Amendments recognized.
¶58
For homeless people, social rights still bear a high cost in the United States.
Homeless people are often forced to participate in social programs that relieve the more
tangible challenges they face, but deny them membership within collective identities and
communities that constitute elements of citizenship. Similarly, legal decisions that
depend on a finding of involuntary homelessness deprive the homeless of the economic
independence that is a foundational element of citizenship. Courts insist that the
homeless be without economic options before they are willing to strike down laws that
criminalize homelessness or conduct incident to homelessness. 160 While it may be
reasonable to argue that the bounds of the Constitution and the Eighth Amendment in
particular limit the courts‘ discretion in addressing issues of homelessness, it is
nonetheless true that homeless plaintiffs must function within a system in which to be
homeless is either to be a criminal or to be a charity case, neither of which is compatible
with citizenship. Marshall argues that economic independence is a central civil right and
the foundation of citizenship. Dependence on the state has historically been an indicator
of being less than a citizen. 161 Requiring homeless people to accept the charity of the
state denies them the right to occupy their time as they choose. If the choice between
sleeping outside and sleeping in a shelter is eliminated, by being required to sleep in a
shelter, homeless people become a group that does not enjoy independence or the full
rights of the rest of the community.
¶59
Perhaps the most relevant portion of Marshall‘s essay is his exploration of the
relationship and conflict between citizenship and social class. Marshall defines
citizenship briefly as ―a status bestowed on those who are full members of a
community.‖162 ―All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and
duties with which the status is endowed.‖163 In contrast, social class is a ―system of
inequality.‖164 While it would seem that social class and universal citizenship would be
incompatible within a governmental system, Marshall instead argues that the equalization
of status created by citizenship allowed for continued and culturally normalized social
disparities. 165
¶60
The development of governmental methods to deal with the ―more unpleasant‖
aspects of social inequality legitimized social inequality. 166 Welfare programs that
159

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (―The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
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provided the bare minimum of support prevented the poor from complaining that they
were denied rights and allowed a system of inequality to continue. Rather than
eliminating class distinctions, these class-abatement measures enforced a system of social
class and, by eliminating its most objectionable elements, minimized the potential for
criticism of it. Furthermore, governmental aid was not a benefit of citizenship, but a
replacement for it. By employing social benefits or rights to eliminate social inequality,
the government took on what had traditionally been the role of private charities.167 The
social benefit was bestowed not as a matter of right, but out of benevolence. 168
¶61
Instead of any kind of positive assurance of social equality, civil rights developed
as the core of citizenship.169 Unlike social rights, civil rights were compatible and even
necessary to the maintenance of social inequalities. Civil rights granted economic
independence and freedom to compete in the market economy. 170 The system of social
rights informed by economic independence both defined citizenship and perpetuated
systems of disparate social class. In a capitalist economy, a full citizen cannot be
economically dependent on others in society or on the government. This paradigm,
however, guarantees nothing more than equality of status. The shift from disparities of
status to citizenship, which established one universal status, created a ―foundation of
equality on which the structure of inequality could be built.‖ 171 By alleviating or at least
obscuring the elements of poverty that most starkly demonstrated social injustice, social
programs legitimized a system of citizenship based on civil, and primarily economic,
rights.172
C. National Identity and the Home
According to Marshall‘s hypothesis, citizenship is more than legally holding the
same rights as all other citizens. Rather, citizenship involves membership in a
community, or as Marshall states, ―a kind of basic human equality.‖ 173 The connection
between citizenship and membership in a community, or more specifically, national
identity, is developed in both Marshall's work and the work of Kathleen Arnold. 174
Arnold‘s book, Homelessness, Citizenship, and Identity, deals with the denial of
citizenship to the homeless by excluding them from political identities. 175 Arnold focuses
on national identity and its connection to the home.176
¶63
First, Marshall discusses national identity as an extension of the community
membership that is integral to citizenship. For Marshall, citizenship requires "a direct
sense of community membership based on loyalty to a [civilization] which is a common
possession."177 National consciousness developed in concurrence with civil rights. As
¶62
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civil rights expanded and were enjoyed by a greater number of people, a collective
identity also developed as a result of the benefits of those rights. 178 Marshall notes that a
lack of political power prevented collective identity from translating into social equality
immediately, but instead was used as a collective bargaining tool by unions. 179 The
national identity that developed allowed citizens, particularly workers, to use civil rights
as a tool in the economic sphere. Collective bargaining, based not just on free market
economic forces but on collective identity and rights, allowed workers as a class to
demand social rights as a matter of entitlement. 180 The same concept translates more
broadly to the political sphere. 181
¶64
Arnold, like Marshall, finds that economic independence is essential to
citizenship.182 For Arnold, the formal elements of citizenship are either birthright
citizenship or blood citizenship and political membership in a sovereign system to the
exclusion of other groups.183
¶65
Building on this last category, Arnold also identifies less legalistically formal
elements of citizenship. Nationalism or national identity is embodied in a "homogenous
ideal" under which those representing difference are othered.184 Movements challenging
that homogeneity are thought to infringe upon national identity rather than representing
another facet of it. Historically, the exclusion from the ideal (whether national identity or
political or economic power) has been legitimized by defining ―others‖ as naturally unfit
for political participation or citizenship. 185 This theory is compatible with Marshall's
analysis of social rights.186 Those who require support (from the state, from their
husbands, from their parents, etc.) are denied the same status granted to autonomous,
economically independent sector of the citizenry. 187 Under Arnold‘s and Marshall‘s
theories, membership in national identity has become inextricably linked with citizenship.
¶66
Like Marshall, Arnold also ties autonomy to citizenship. 188 For example, laws
designed to protect women may paradoxically result in restricting women‘s autonomy,
thus denying them full citizenship. 189 For Arnold, having a home is a precondition for
freedom and a ―symbol of self and self-identity.‖190 Regardless of the home's actual
ability to provide stability or privacy, it is symbolic of the homogenous ideal. 191 Arnold
postulates that the growing of homelessness might actually solidify the line drawn
between citizens and the homeless because concepts of the home/homeland are
constructed to exclude, and national identity depends on ―the other.‖192
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For Arnold, the solution to the ―othering‖ of the homeless and to their systemic
exclusion from citizenship lies in shifting the concepts of ―home.‖ Arnold insists on a
more fluid definition of ―home,‖ and as a result, of ―us.‖193 The politics of homelessness,
that Arnold suggests, would loosen the connection between the home and national
identity and give the homeless a voice in the political process. 194
IV. DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP

¶68

Under the legal structures discussed above, the homeless are legally disabled in a
number of ways. They are restricted in the rights they can exercise and in the resources
they can access. Lack of property in and of itself is a lack of liberty. 195 By virtue of
being without real property (owned or rented) the homeless are outside of the whole
system of property rights and their protections. Additionally, rights that seem
unconnected to property are also diminished or eliminated based on a lack of
homeownership. For example, because the homeless do not possess a traditional
dwelling, their right to privacy will never carry the same weight as a homeowner‘s. The
homeless will always be more vulnerable to police searches and seizures, and the
activities in which they can engage will be diminished. 196 In the context of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, a reasonable expectation of privacy may exist outside of the
home, 197 but privacy expectations are always greater in a residence. 198 Despite the
Supreme Court‘s admonition in Katz v. United States that the Fourth Amendment applies
to people, not places, certain places are afforded less protection. For example, there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields, 199 but the area surrounding a house is
entitled to extra protection.200 Therefore, the space of homeless people receives less
constitutional protection. The Fourth Amendment rights of the homeless are less
meaningful.
¶69
Lack of a traditional residence also diminishes the right and the ability of the
homeless to participate in the political process. States implement residency duration
requirements, mailing address requirements, and/or identifying documentation
requirements in order to vote. Some states strike voters who fail to respond to mailed
confirmations from their voting lists. 201 While a home cannot be a legal requirement in
193
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order to vote, these legal obstacles often effectively eliminate the ability of the homeless
to participate in the voting process in practice. Both civil and political liberties, then, are
diluted for those who do not have homes.
¶70
Despite the serious limitations that these obstacles pose to both the civil and
political rights of the homeless, they are not traditionally viewed as eliminating the rights
or citizenship of the homeless. Because the United States has developed a system of
rights, based exclusively on negative liberties, failure to exercise a right or the inability to
exercise a right is not seen as eliminating it. Even if a right is meaningless to an entire
group, at least in part because of the actions of the state, as long as the state does not
eliminate or infringe upon the right facially, the rights of that group are not considered to
have been violated. The First Amendment right to free speech is not a right to speak but
a right against government infringement on speech. The Fourteenth Amendment right to
equal protection does not guarantee that protected classes will receive the same
compensation, employment, or educational attainment. It only guarantees that the
government will not deliberately prevent protected classes from engaging in certain
activities. In addition, the United States does not guarantee a right to food, water,
housing, education, or many other benefits. 202 Rights are defined by a lack of
government involvement, and that is all any person is entitled to, no matter what
conditions result in his or her inability to exercise that right successfully. Nonetheless,
the practical and even definitional limitations that the legal structure imposes on the
rights of the homeless place them in a position of arguing for hollow rights or for secondclass citizenship at best.
¶71
In addition, the de facto limitations on civil and political rights of the homeless
deny citizenship to the homeless in more subtle ways. Under Marshall‘s and Arnold‘s
theories, economic independence is an essential component of citizenship. 203 A lack of
economic independence coupled with a total exclusion from political and national
identity results in non-citizenship. The homeless are essentially stateless. Their lack of
economic independence and of a home removes them from the political process. Not
only are the homeless excluded from civil and political rights, but our conception of the
―us‖ entitled to those rights, in other words citizens, also excludes the homeless.
Criminalizing sleeping in public spaces, for example, delegitimizes the voice of the
homeless, the people who would sleep in public spaces, in the political process. The
politics of such a statute only considers the uses of those spaces by, for example, business
people, dog walkers, or picnickers who will then return to their private residences. Public
space is only public for those who have houses. Those who do not may be excluded, not
only from public space itself, but from the very definition of ―public.‖
¶72
Court decisions that refuse to provide relief from the criminalization of
homelessness underpin the home as central to membership in local and national
communities. By sanctioning cities‘ prohibition of all behaviors associated with
homelessness, the courts sanction the exclusion of the homeless not only from cities‘
parks and sidewalks, but from their citizenry. In Lehr v. City of Sacramento, the City of
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Sacramento made all living or camping outdoors, in all public spaces, a crime. 204 The
city explicitly stated its intention to exclude homeless people from the community when
it defined the homeless‘s use of public space as not ―lawful and ordinary.‖205 The city
was willing to ensure, through the use of a criminal code, that the homeless‘ existence
remained outside of normalized and state-sanctioned uses of public space. If living
outdoors is criminal, only those with a home may be included in the law-abiding
citizenry, and only their uses of public space are ―lawful and ordinary.‖ 206 The homeless
are fundamentally not lawful, ordinary, or part of the ―us‖ that uses public space in statesanctioned ways. The state does not include the homeless when providing protections for
those ―ordinary‖ citizens. Instead, the homeless are grouped with criminals, simply
because they do not possess homes.
¶73
Rather than undermine the denial of citizenship to the homeless, even those cases
that are ostensibly in their favor tend to reinforce their exclusion from political
identity.207 In a negative rights paradigm, citizenship is conditioned on the forfeiting of
social benefits.208 As a result, the legal solutions that have been most successful in
disturbing the laws that threaten the rights of the homeless to exist within certain spaces
are unsuccessful in upsetting a paradigm that perpetually defines them as something less
than citizens. Eighth Amendment challenges to anti-camping measures that assert an
unconstitutional criminalization of status have not all been successful. Even when they
have, courts have universally demanded that behavior like sleeping be involuntary before
they will hold that it is integral to the status of homelessness. 209 In Anderson, for
example, the court found that anti-camping ordinances are unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment if there is insufficient shelter space for all of the homeless people in
the city.210 While this decision prohibits the physical exclusion of the homeless from
public space under certain circumstances, it endorses a regime of symbolic exclusion.
Cities are still allowed to criminalize all behavior associated with homelessness. They
may define homelessness as fundamentally othered and outside of public spaces. They
may eliminate any agency the homeless have within the political sphere.
¶74
Underlying the rationale in this and other similar decisions is the idea that behavior
integral to homelessness can be criminalized if there is some kind of social rights scheme
that provides, for example, housing available to the homeless. This scheme does not
have to be provided by the state. The statistics that courts consider in determining
whether or not there is enough shelter space available to the homeless do not distinguish
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between private and public shelter space. 211 A person who chooses not to enter a shelter
because of religious beliefs, an opposition to its policies, or fear of their own safety has
no recourse under the Eighth Amendment.212 The homeless still may not choose to use
public space. Instead, they are forced to accept social benefits as alternatives to full
citizenship and autonomy.
The homeless are left in the untenable position of choosing between arrest and
criminalization by a system that excludes them from community, national and political
identity, and the proverbial ―us,‖ and surrendering full citizenship to accept ―benefits‖ not
extended to the economically independent and propertied. Court decisions striking down
ordinances under the Eighth Amendment create temporary solutions for the
criminalization of the homeless, but are complicit in the system that fails to include the
homeless in citizenship and perpetually others them.
Under Anderson, the homeless may not make any meaningful decision regarding
where they will sleep or live. 213 They may not use public space in the ways that they
would choose to as members of the public, but only as wards for whom the state has
failed to provide.214 They have no more rights, no greater membership, and no more
agency than the plaintiffs in Lehr.215 The court gives them space (or at least the potential
for space), but in a system that insists on real property as a requisite for membership, it
cannot give them full citizenship.
The relationship between property and liberty figures heavily in this analysis. In
the United States, the connection between property and liberty is especially close because
of the extent to which our system has developed around negative liberties. The United
States guarantees numerous freedoms from government intrusion, but rarely guarantees,
as a fundamental liberty, some governmental benefit. 216 This negative liberty regime
ensures that economic independence remains a central tenet of citizenship and that what
might otherwise be considered positive or social rights instead remain alternatives to
citizenship. Courts are undoubtedly confined by this regime in making decisions, and
have further confined themselves to decisions that are unable to address the structural
issues that drive the interaction between homelessness and citizenship.
However, courts are not completely unable to help change the structures that
exclude the homeless from citizenship and national identity. The court in Pottinger came
closest to recognizing the homeless as legitimate citizens and not outside of what is
normal in its discussion of the plaintiffs‘ Fourth Amendment claims. 217 That court stated:
[T]he interior of the bedrolls and bags or boxes of personal effects
belonging to homeless individuals in this case is perhaps the last trace of
privacy they have. In addition, the property of homeless individuals is
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often located in the parks or under the overpasses that they consider their
homes.218
¶79

Rather than depending on normalized expectations of what traditional residences
are to determine when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Pottinger
court credited the plaintiffs‘ use of alternative spaces as ―home‖ or areas to be
safeguarded and constitutionally protected.219 This decision marks a step in the right
direction for including the homeless in citizenship. The kind of respect the Pottinger
court gave to the plaintiffs‘ alternative living situations has not appeared in Eighth
Amendment challenges. Furthermore, courts may be reluctant to apply the Eighth
Amendment because of the limits of the Robinson doctrine. However, if the courts begin
to acknowledge alternative living situations as protectable or as ―homes,‖ citizenship may
begin to lose its too-tight bond with traditional residences and the homeless may begin to
be included in what we identify as ―us.‖
V. CONCLUSIONS: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

¶80

Solutions to the othering of the homeless are much more difficult in a system that
rests on concepts of negative liberties. Particularly because the United States is
fundamentally tied to a negative liberty regime, positive liberty solutions that guarantee
certain benefits as part of, rather than instead of, citizenship may be unlikely. 220
Transforming social rights from a position of defining sub-citizenship to part of the
definition of full citizenship would represent a structural shift for the American
governmental system. In addition, unless political identity shifts along with positive
rights strategies and parallel shifts in judicial decisions, these measures will continue to
act as social rights that are alternatives to citizenship.
¶81
One interesting effect of the economic crisis, and particularly the rise in
foreclosures, may be to enact such a shift in our conceptualizations of ―us.‖ The crisis
has created new homeless who, until recently, owned homes and were undoubtedly
included in our national identity. 221 Under the current economic conditions, it has
become more difficult to draw self/other lines when it comes to homelessness. People
with steady jobs and families who, until recently, owned their own homes, are now living
in shelters or in their cars.222 As the result of broad economic problems, both our concept
of ―us‖ and our concept of ―home‖ may shift. This crisis of identity may help to create
more fluid conceptualizations of ―us‖ and allow homeless people to be embraced as full
citizens.
¶82
Shifting the concept of ―home‖ in legal and social contexts will be difficult. As
this Comment argues, the legal structures that affect the homeless are difficult to
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challenge in court. Even those challenges to anti-homeless laws that are successful often
accept the dominant discourse that excludes the homeless from national identity or any
part in ―the public.‖ Under the theories of Marshall and Arnold, the Eighth Amendment
decisions that grant the homeless relief exclude them from autonomous citizenship at the
same time. The laws that infringe on the ability of the homeless to sleep, sit, stand, and
even be in a city are never seen as laws infringing on members of the citizenry. Instead,
these statutes are acceptable unless they eliminate the last option of the homeless. Only
then will the courts step in, and even then they do not suggest that the homeless must be
included in what it means to be public, but merely that if there are no other options the
homeless may not be excluded from all public space. These statutes, decisions, and the
discourse that informs them, place the homeless outside of ―the public‖ and deny them
effective citizenship. The economic crisis may help to shift what it means to be part of
―the public‖ away from the home. Finally, courts may also be able to contribute to such a
shift by legitimizing alternatives to traditional residences as worthy of legal protection.

472

